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Following the path of Popova’s (2015) enactive 
approach to narrative, this inquiry focuses on 
two clusters of metaphors around which Herodo-
tus organized his perceptions about isonomia and 
demokratia: the cognitive and the pragmatic. In-
stead of highlighting differences between isonomia 
and demokratia, we wish to evince cumulative in-
teractions between both concepts, a process that 
allows us to make sense of one — demokratia 
— through the other — isonomia. This approach is 
also helpful to transpose ancient meditations upon 
democracy to contemporary contexts not because 
ancient and contemporary democracies look sim-
ilar, but because those meditations are constituent 
Siguiendo el enfoque enactivo aplicado por Popova 
(2015) a la narrativa, esta investigación se centra en 
dos grupos de metáforas en torno a las cuales He-
ródoto organizó sus percepciones sobre isonomia y 
demokratia: el cognitivo y el pragmático. En lugar 
de destacar las diferencias entre isonomia y demo-
kratia, deseamos evidenciar interacciones acumu-
lativas entre ambos conceptos, un proceso que nos 
permite dar sentido a una — demokratia — a través 
de la otra — isonomia. Este enfoque también es útil 
para transponer meditaciones de la Antigüedad so-
bre la democracia a contextos contemporáneos, no 
porque las democracias antiguas y contemporáneas 
sean similares, sino porque esas meditaciones son 
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1. Introduction
What does democracy imply when a man like Otanes puts it forward and a 
few moments later, after seeing himself unable to enforce his original prop-
osition, re-configures it as a sort of «private democracy» exclusive for his 
private house? Would there be any significative difference between isono-
mia, the very word Herodotus employed to allegedly report Otanes’ original 
phrasing, and demokratia, the word he uses to refer to Cleisthenes’ new 
Athenian configuration? How similar or distinct was Otanes’ initiatives from 
Cleisthenes’, and with which consequences respectively for isonomia and 
demokratia? How does this perception impact our understanding about Hero-
dotus’ understanding of democracy? And how can it still help us understand 
and promote democratic-oriented practices?
This text addresses such questions through an enactive approach of Hero-
dotus’ so-called Persian debate (III 80-82), its immediate outcomes, and 
Cleisthenes’ digression (V 66-73). Instead of focusing on philological issues 
of content and structure or on the debate’s Nachleben, we intend to parse and 
analyze the cognitive and pragmatic metaphors by means of which Herodotus 
concocts his understanding of both isonomia and demokratia. The text focus-
es on his narrativity, the intentional construction of stories with which at the 
same time Herodotus creates sense out of a mass of dispersed information 
and so invites his receivers to analogous sense-making processes. 
Inquiries on what Herodotus allegedly reported and how he structured 
those passages have been conducted by many scholars in recent years1. A 
1 On the Persian debate see e.g.: Evans 1981; Darbo-Peschanski 1987; Flory 1987; Latein-
er 1989; Moles 1993; Fowler 2001; Forsdyke 2001; Cartledge and Greenwood 2002; Dewald 
parts of the democracy-metaphors we currently live 
by, and whose roots one can see in the attributes 
Herodotus ascribed to it in III 80-82 and V 66-73. 
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partes constitutivas de las metáforas de la demo-
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raíces se pueden ver en los atributos que Heródoto 
le asigna en III 80-82 y V 66-73.
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hermeneutical approach that highlights the text’s metaphors by taking into 
account the debate’s strategic position in book III has not yet been tried, 
though. Indeed, when one examines the roles the historian ascribed to Otanes 
and Darius —the leading speakers whose decisive attitudes along book III are 
closely intertwined and have led straight to that debate and its unpredictable 
outcomes—, one’s perception about isonomia is immediately challenged. The 
isonomia Herodotus ascribes to Otanes will emerge as a notion complementa-
ry to that of democracy as a system of government derived from popular ini-
tiative and enforced by popular power, notwithstanding these very same attri-
butes being voiced by Otanes at the closure of his speech. At the same time, 
the steps Cleisthenes took to reform Athenian society precisely articulate these 
very same initiatives, even if not described as democratization by Herodotus.
This research is interdisciplinary and benefits from historiographical and 
enactive approaches as well. Once combined, the takeaways these approach-
es are expected to produce may bring new perspectives to studies on both 
Herodotus’ narrativity and democracy theory. The enactive approach to nar-
rative formulated by Popova (2015) comprehends narratives as coherent se-
ries of reported events oriented by cause-and-effect sequences sometimes 
articulated by metaphors, always with a telicity, or precise end, in view. 
Narrativity is the byproduct of participatory sense-making co-involving text 
and receivers, and an approach centered on it has never been applied to an-
cient historiographical texts so far2. 
This inquiry focuses on two clusters of metaphors around which Herodo-
tus seems to have organized his perceptions about isonomia and demokratia: 
cognitive and pragmatic (discussed below). Otanes and Cleisthenes, the chief 
characters this text focuses on, will end up as conceptual metonymies through 
which one can access the constituents of those target metaphors3. Instead of 
2002, 2007, 2012; Pelling 2002; Asheri et al. 2007; Cartledge 2007; Marincola 2007; Martin 
2011; Schmitt 2011; Baragwanath & De Bakker 2012; Roy 2012; Sissa 2012; Branscome 
2013; De Vido 2014; Marzi 2015; Rhodes 2018; Thomas 2018; Soares 2018; Linderbord 
2019. On Cleisthenes’ digression see below.
2 For a cognitive approach —Mental Spaces— applied to factual narratives (news) see 
Van Krieken & Sanders 2019. For analogous approaches —Mediation and Reception Theo-
ry— applied to ancient historiographical narratives see respectively Sebastiani 2015, 2017.
3 For conceptual metonymy as «a cognitive process where a source content provides ac-
cess to a target content within one cognitive domain», see Panther & Thornburg 2014, p. 242.
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highlighting differences between isonomia and demokratia such as the ones 
already identified by Vlastos (1953, p. 347), Ober (1989, pp. 74-75; 2007, p. 
95), Raaflaub (2007, pp. 112-120), Cartledge (2007, pp. 159-163), Roy (2012, 
p. 308), and Olivera (2016, p. 165), we wish to evince cumulative interac-
tions between both concepts and the way they allow us to make sense of one 
—demokratia— through the other —isonomia—. This approach also quali-
fies for helping us transpose ancient meditations upon democracy to contem-
porary contexts, not because ancient and contemporary democracies look 
similar, but because those meditations help form the democracy-metaphors 
we currently live by, whose roots one can see in the attributes Herodotus 
ascribed to it in passages like the ones to be discussed.
At the same time, Di Paolo’s (2014) insight on non-sense as background 
to sense and sense-making will help us postulate meanings for the metaphors 
enacted by Otanes and Cleisthenes. Two issues within Herodotus’ narrative 
can only be hinted at through very indirect and disconnected mentions, yet 
they form the essential background for the kind of political reforms democ-
racy implied by the end of sixth-century B.C.: the dissymmetry between the 
economic situation of the propositors of democracy and its future beneficiar-
ies, and the prompt communicational interaction between proposers and re-
ceivers, so agile and effective as in contemporary online forms, to the point 
of assimilating contemporary democracies to their ancient and direct homo-
nym forms. Along with Wood (2012), Petrucciani (2014), Patriquin (2015), 
Mounk (2018), and O’Connor & Weatherall (2019), our inquiry will try to 
evince the decisive role of economic and communicational factors to trigger-
ing democratic reforms, notwithstanding not even being alluded at in Hero-
dotus’ Histories.
So this text is accordingly divided into four main subsequent sections. In 
the next one, we discuss the Persian debate in light of the clues given by 
Herodotus about Otanes and Darius throughout book III. Our aim is to define 
the cognitive metaphors embedded in Otanes’ isonomia. In section 3, we 
trace a parallel between former section’s findings and Cleisthenes’ attitudes 
narrated along V 66-73, thus examining the same metaphors, but now embed-
ded in Herodotus’ demokratia. In section 4, we correlate the so far provisory 
conclusions with pragmatic issues that might have been at stake when isono-
mia and demokratia were respectively advocated by Otanes and triggered by 
Cleisthenes. Finally, in section 5 we sum up the inquiry’s concluding re-
marks. 
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2.  Otanes and isonomia 
Before and after the Persian debate there is at least one capital passage 
out of which cognitive metaphors cluster around isonomia as advocated by 
Otanes. We are understanding metaphor as a «thought process that relies on 
taxonomic relations of similarities», «as a cognitive process of reorganizing 
experience whereby a set of properties and relations constituting knowledge 
about one entity are used to think about a new target entity» (Popova 2015, 
pp. 98 and 102-103)4. We suggest two kinds of leading metaphors to guide 
this exam, each involving both isonomia and demokratia and their comple-
mentary distinctions. Cognitive metaphors cluster narrative elements about 
the truthfulness or not of Herodotus’ text, its characters’ original intentions 
represented as either truthful or not, and the attitudes they take —or not— 
when advocating isonomia or demokratia. These metaphors explicitly high-
light how thinking leads to actions. Pragmatic metaphors, on the other hand, 
group the ways the same characters could rely on to enforce —or not— their 
original propositions, and how these ways foment interactions between them 
and their immediate, intra-narrative receivers. These metaphors highlight, 
always through indirect allusions, the complementary way round: how mate-
rial conditions impact thought production. Accordingly, we start with the first 
block of metaphors. To spot interactions among leading metaphors allows us 
to build up our current perception of democracy as grounded in truth-seek-
ing, collective construction, aspiration to economic equality, and trustworthy 
horizontal communication.
In the case of Otanes, cognitive metaphors are the means Herodotus uses 
to point at the different ways of his dealing with truth or lies in comparison 
to Darius, then finally advocating isonomia as a consequence of it, however 
not exclusively. In the end, the «new target entities» to be evinced by the 
following exam will reveal a coherent pattern: Otanes as a man who changes 
mind and stance, sliding from a truth-seeker at the beginning, then advocate 
of isonomia, finally into a paradoxical situation (either coherent with his 
original intentions or diametrically opposed to them) in the closure of the 
story; Darius, from beginning to end, remains as the consistent manipulator 
of truth and lies up until achieving the Persian kingship. The cognitive met-
4 For metaphors as patterns of conceptual association according to cognitive linguistics 
see also Grady 2007, Gibbs Jr 2014, Tay 2014.
38 B R E N O  B A T T I S T I N  S E B A S T I A N I  y  D E L F I M  F E R R E I R A  L E Ã O
Emerita LXXXVIII 1, 2020, pp. 33-57 ISSN 0013-6662 https://doi.org/10.3989/emerita.2020.03.1943
aphors embedded in Otanes’ character will thus evince the fundamental orig-
inal link between truth-seeking and isonomia which will be key also to de-
mocracy.
To comprehend how Herodotus intentionally articulated a chain of cause-
and-effects where the cognitive metaphors are embedded, we must first bear 
in mind the intellectual environment of relations between truth and lies that 
constitutes this book. According to Asheri (Asheri et al. 2007, p. 391), «[t]he 
leitmotif of Book III is, essentially, the metaphysical and moral conflict 
between falsehood and truth». The commentator then pins down all paragraphs 
involving truth, lies, and/or deceit, although remarkably leaving out para-
graph 80, which begins with a statement by the main narrator, Herodotus, 
about the truthfulness of the following scene: «[t]here are those in Greece 
who are not convinced of the authenticity of the speeches that were delivered 
there, but they did take place» (III 80.1)5. The so called Persian debate, its 
antecedents and outcomes, are thus rooted in that cognitive environment, so 
that isonomia-issues are from the starting part of the cognitive metaphors 
clustered around truth and lies.
The first encounter between Otanes and Darius in book III is remarkable 
for its intra-narrative and meta-historiographic implications. The issue at 
stake for the seven Persian noblemen is how to deal with the usurper Magus. 
When Darius suggests that the other six should follow him and act immedi-
ately, Otanes argues for «a more cautious approach» (ἐπὶ τὸ σωφρονέστερον 
- III 71.3). Darius then strongly defends his previous advice, even threatening 
to denounce the plot to the Magus if necessary (III 71.5). So Otanes urges 
him to show them how to pass by the palace guards (III 72.1), and receives 
the following reply from Darius:
Where a lie is necessary, let it be spoken. Our objective is the same whether 
we use lies or the truth to achieve it. People lie when they expect to profit 
from others’ falling for their lies, and they tell the truth for the same reason 
–to attract some profit to themselves or to gain more room to manoeuvre in. 
In other words, the means may differ but we’re after the same thing. If there’s 
no profit to be gained, our truth-teller might as well lie and our liar might as 
well tell the truth (III 72.4-5).
5 All translations from Herodotus come from Waterfield (Herodotus 1998) unless other-
wise stated. All quotations from the original Greek come from Hude’s edition (Herodoti 1927).
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It is through this first interaction between the two men that Herodotus 
presents the intellectual and ethical guidelines which will impact how recei-
vers are invited to understand their role along book III. On the one hand, 
Otanes personifies the shrewd and prudent man responsible for unmasking 
the usurper after having his suspicions (ὑπώπτευσε, ὑποπτεύσας - III 68.2) 
proved correct (III 68-70). On the other, Darius enacts the bold entrepreneur 
eager to act, with few scruples, a lot of stamina, and with a permanent focus 
on accumulating power. Like a ἵστωρ, Otanes unmasks the false Smerdis 
deducing through precise signs (his not having ears - III 69.6) reported by his 
own daughter. Darius, on the other hand, tools up truth and lies alike by fo-
cusing exclusively on the aim at stake (III 72.4; italicized). Besides, in the 
syntagm «ὁμοίως ἂν ὅ τε ἀληθιζόμενος ψευδὴς εἴη καὶ ὁ ψευδόμενος ἀληθής», 
εἴη is ambivalent. An alternative translation, implying that one can be both 
truthful or liar at the same time, would say in a slightly different manner but 
far more incisively the palindrome: «the truthful one would be a liar, and 
conversely the liar, truthful». Through Darius’ mouth Herodotus forges a 
historiographical version of the «liar paradox», a kind of behavior perfectly 
illustrative of what the future king will perform in the next paragraphs6.
After slaughtering the usurper and being greeted by a people who repli-
cates the attitude, slaughtering the other Magi (III 79.2-3), three of the seven 
Persian noblemen discuss «the general state of things» (III 80.1). Then
Otanes recommended entrusting the management of the country to the Per-
sian people. ... A monarch subverts a country’s ancestral customs, takes wom-
en against their will, and kills men without trial. What about majority rule, on 
the other hand? In the first place, it has the best of all names to describe it 
—equality before the law. In the second place, it is entirely free of the vices 
of monarchy. It is government by lot, it is accountable government, and it 
refers all decisions to the common people. So I propose that we abandon 
monarchy and increase the power of the people, because everything depends 
on their numbers (III 80.2-6).
Otanes’ definition of ἰσονομίη is built a) upon features associated with 
democracies in antiquity (italicized) and later endorsed by Herodotus in his 
own narrative voice through a direct allusion to the Persian debate (VI 
6 Further discussion and references: Sebastiani 2018a.
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43.3), and b) against two κακότητες closely associated with tyranny (ὕβρις 
and φθόνος).
Megabyzus comes next and dismisses democracy by relying on moral 
complaints against the people (III 81.1), reproaches with which Darius will 
agree from the start (III 82.1) and that are generically associated with 
κακότητες (III 82.3). Both Megabyzus and Darius limit themselves to criti-
cizing democracy from its moral angle, without uttering a single word about 
its positive aspects suggested by Otanes in III 80.6. Besides, at the end of his 
speech Darius asks:
One point sums the whole thing up — where did we get our independence 
from and who gave it to us? Was it the people or an oligarchy or a monarch? 
My view, then, is that since we gained our freedom thanks to a single individ-
ual, we should keep to this way of doing things. And I would add that we 
should not abolish our ancestral customs (πατρίους νόμους), which serve us 
well (III 82.5).
Darius’ conclusions imply that isonomia, like monarchy and freedom as 
well, is also a gift to be given by someone to a collectivity —that is, to be 
proposed from above—, a perception that he and Otanes share. The next 
paragraph is still more revealing about the communion of interests deeply 
shared by both. As «four out of the seven endorsed Darius’ view» (III 83.1), 
Otanes gives up:
«My fellow conspirators», he said, «whether we choose by lot, or give the 
Persian people the chance to elect their preferred candidate, or use some oth-
er method, it will obviously be one of us who is to become king. Under these 
circumstances, I am not going to stand against you as a candidate; I have as 
little desire to be a ruler as I have to be ruled. However, I renounce my claim 
to the kingdom on one condition —that I and my descendants should never 
be ruled by any of you». The other six agreed to his idea, so he stood down 
and did not compete against them for the kingdom (III 83.2-3).
Otanes’ desire (italicized) is puzzling, to say the least: should it be taken 
as a sort of anarchist manifesto? And how does it impact Otanes’ very notion 
of ἰσονομίη? What kind of democracy would grant someone not being ruler 
nor ruled? Is his renunciation and wish to remain «unrulable» a mark of his 
alleged σωφροσύνη (a posture between caution and fear), or a token that, like 
Darius’, his chief interests were concentrated upon his own personal ends, in 
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the case his own ἐλευθερία? Sissa argues for a «“time sensitive” reading» 
whose chief strategy would be, following Solon’s advice, «[l]et us look at the 
end!» (2012, pp. 232-233; original italics). There are different ways to under-
stand this suggestion and one of them is particularly intriguing. The end of this 
story is not, as she proposes, the end of the Histories, but the paragraph above 
and the «horse stratagem» (III 84-87) that follows immediately and grants 
Darius the kingship. Yet at the closure of Otanes’ participation in this story, 
was it with ἰσονομίη that he was rewarded, provided that his own house would 
be the only one in the kingdom to dispose of the same unrestricted freedom 
as the king’s? How should we understand the public-and-private peculiar con-
dition he was granted with through the consensus of the other six Persians? 
If we answer «yes» to the first question, then it follows that ἰσονομίη might 
mean something more loosely connected with democracy, like a precondition 
for freedom to be seemingly reached out even in private circumstances (ἡ 
οἰκίη - III 83.3) and dependent on someone else’s agreement (συνεχώρεον οἱ 
ἓξ ἐπὶ τούτοισι - III 83.2). Perhaps it might somehow be enforced by a broad-
er collective agreement so as to give rise to a democracy too. But if we answer 
«no», then there is room for democracy and ἰσονομίη be more tightly connect-
ed, if not conveying the same phenomenon. Yet such an answer would have a 
heavy negative implication: Otanes would thus enact an opportunist player far 
more unscrupulous than Darius, in addition to being deeply incoherent. 
Ἰσονομίη would serve as a simple means to his own private goals which, in 
the end, are contemplated either way. And as cognitive metaphors, Darius’ 
behavior and his would be equivalent: the same self-centered opportunism 
Darius relied on from the start is what granted him the Persian kingship, while 
Otanes’ prudence and moderation, or even fear (as implied by his σωφροσύνη), 
would actually be just a mere varnish to hypocrisy. 
Ethical qualifications are central to distinguish isonomia from the back-
ground of vices associated with tyranny7. Otanes’ attitudes impact how we 
ought to understand isonomia in light of the attitudes enacted by its proponent 
and critic as well. This explains why, in Persian eyes at least, Darius’ appeal to 
a monarchy would be in accordance with, and positively appreciated by, Per-
sian πάτριοι νόμοι, being ἰσονομίη a mistake or a political paradox for them. 
7 On a fundamental dichotomy structuring Otanes’ speech as isonomia (democracy) vs. 
tyranny, a thesis we are relying on here, see Musti 2018, pp. 54-56.
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Up until this point we have already the chief elements that allow us to define 
the cognitive metaphors clustering around isonomia. Otanes’ attachment to 
truth-seeking goes hand in hand with a changing and adaptive attitude, thus 
framing isonomia as byproduct of the conjunction of veracity and versatility8. 
These metaphors also bring forth, however, two other elements that concur to 
form Herodotus’ view of isonomia: it was proposed from above, from a power-
ful man to his fellows, not amid debates with the Persian people; and the 
privilege Otanes was awarded with at the closure of his participation in the 
scene points to an anarchic rather than democratic bias in his proposition. These 
two elements make isonomia share with forms of autocracy of two of their 
most distinguished features. With Cleisthenes, however, a significant change 
occurs. In the next section, the same cognitive metaphors will be seen associ-
ated with him but in a distinct way —predominantly through its ethical aspects.
3. Cleisthenes and demokratia
Around the cognitive metaphors associated with Otanes we see clustering 
respectively truth-seeking and adaptability. But when we contrast isonomia 
and demokratia in Herodotus’ text, to these clusters two other fundamental el-
ements shall be added: the emptiness or renunciation (ὑπεξίσταμαι in Otanes’ 
words) implied by isonomia, and activity implied by democracy. These stanc-
es form the core around which the ethical metaphors respectively associated 
with isonomia and demokratia are organized. Accordingly, this section will 
focus on Cleisthenes’ activities and the ethics that guided his steps, so as to 
make clear how both were intrinsically dependent on his material background 
and communication abilities as well.
In a dispute with Isagoras about ascendancy over the Athenians, Cleis-
thenes took a path distinct from that which half-century ago a then would-be 
Athenian tyrant, Peisistratus, had successfully taken (I 59.4-5, I 60.3): instead 
of deceiving the people, though, he made himself close to them, even if as a 
secondary choice9.
8 For the concept of «framing device» see Baragwanath & De Bakker 2012, p. 40; Thomas 
2018, p. 266.
9 On the decisive role played by the Athenian people in 508/7 against the threat of tyranny 
posed by Isagoras and the Spartans, as well as the role of Cleisthenes —not as their leader 
but as an innovator—, see Ober 1989, pp. 68-69; Ober 1996, pp. 33-51; De Ste. Croix 2004, 
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There were two particularly powerful men in Athens: Cleisthenes, who was 
an Alcmaeonid (and was the one, reputedly, who bribed the Pythia), and Isa-
goras the son of Tisander, who came from a distinguished house, but one 
whose origins I have been unable to discover. (However, relatives of his offer 
sacrifices to Carian Zeus.) Now, a power struggle took place between these 
two men, which Cleisthenes lost. He then allied himself with the common 
people and instituted the system of ten tribes in Athens, when there had been 
only four before (V 66.1-2).
So when he had won over to his side the ordinary people of Athens, who had 
previously been discounted, he changed the names of the tribes and increased 
their number. He created ten tribal leaders, then, where there had formerly 
been four, and divided the whole population between these ten tribes. And 
once he had won the ordinary people over, he was far more powerful than his 
political opponents (V 69.2).
The man whom Herodotus ascribes the foundation of democracy at Athens 
(VI 131.1) takes the step Otanes was not able to take, or did not want to. 
Cleisthenes’ strategy shows common points with both Darius’ and Otanes’. 
Like both, Cleisthenes firstly disputes to prevail —up until then the people 
had not yet been taken into consideration—. Once failed, though, Cleisthenes 
acts boldly, making himself a friend (προσεταιρίζεται) to the people, an am-
bivalent strategy, now similar to Darius’ (who was supported by the remain-
ing five Persians) and also opposite to Otanes’, who preferred to anxiously 
seclude himself from the political arena. Like Darius and even Peisitratus, 
Cleisthenes did not renounce, but occupied, public spaces in embracing the 
demands of the Athenian people. Differently from them, though —and this 
point is central—, Cleisthenes parcels out the power thus achieved, adapting 
himself to the newborn situation.
Cleisthenes’ attitudes share «taxonomic relations of similarities» with the 
ethical metaphors associated with isonomia, so that these very same attitudes 
help us better understand why isonomia is at the same time fundamentally 
distinct from, and complementary to, democracy. In addition to the occur-
rence in Otanes’ mouth, in the practical sphere, isonomia appears in Herodo-
tus’ Histories as a state of affairs resulting from the condescendence of for-
pp. 133-134; Thorley 2004, pp. 52-53; Musti 2018, p. 3; Patriquin 2015, p. 22; Pritchard 2019, 
p. 2; contra Mossé 2002, p. 28.
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mer tyrants, not as the expression of popular demands to be embraced by a 
powerful ally:
I did not like the way Polycrates was the master of people who were, after all, 
no different from himself, and I would not condone such behaviour from anyone 
else either. Anyway, Polycrates has met his fate. For my part, I put power in the 
hands of all in common and proclaim a state of equality before the law 
(ἰσονομίην). The only privileges I claim for myself are that six talents from 
Polycrates’ fortune be set aside for me, and I would also like to reserve for 
myself and my descendants the priesthood of Zeus the Liberator (III 142.3-4)
The first thing he [Aristagoras] did was relinquish his position as tyrant and 
convert Miletus to a theoretical state of equality before the law (ἰσονομίην), 
so that the citizens of Miletus would voluntarily join in the rebellion. He then 
proceeded to do the same throughout Ionia (V 37.2)
The first passage correlates isonomia with the disruption of a situation 
where someone acts as a δεσπότης above his equals, then resigns power but 
asking something in return for it as a compensation for the future lost authori-
ty —like Otanes’ speech suggests—. From the second passage, it is evident the 
central role played by renunciation for isonomia to come true. «Equality before 
the law» essentially means absence of political dissymmetries caused by the 
renunciation enacted by a tyrant —that is, the resulting state derived from a 
simplification, i.e. the extinction of the only destabilizing political agent in a 
community—. This renunciation of the public space implies that everyone within 
this space remains theoretically equal before each other, in a way that bare 
space is free to be occupied by whatever form of power —or even the total 
absence of it, like anarchy— ranging from the broadest democracy to a strict 
individualistic autocracy (as Otanes’ «unrulable» condition turned out to be). 
Democracy, on the other hand, implies an active role on the part of a demos 
who intentionally occupies public spaces, thus controlling their own decisions 
and their enforcement, that is, courageously accepting the nuanced complexity 
of a new socio-political reality. This sort of return to a hypothetical original 
state of things that isonomia conveys seems reinforced in Herodotus by its very 
absence when the historian needs to qualify the new situation in Athens after 
Cleisthenes’ reforms —that is, when democracy is operationalized—:
So Athens flourished. Now, the advantages of everyone having a voice 
(ἰσηγορίη) in the political procedure are not restricted just to single instanc-
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es, but are plain to see wherever one looks. For instance, while the Atheni-
ans were ruled by tyrants, they were no better at warfare than any of their 
neighbours, but once they had got rid of the tyrants they became vastly 
superior (V 78.1)
This new state of things is called isegorie. Like democracy, isegorie also 
implies political activity, a state perfectly fit for a new reality in a city where 
democracy was built upon its chief fundament, isonomia. Again, like Darius 
and Peisistratus before him, Cleisthenes also enacts a trajectory marked by 
activities whose aim is precisely the consecution of an original intention. 
Differently from them, though, Cleisthenes’ initiatives turn out as a collective 
sharing of powers, not as autocracy. Otanes, on the other hand, envisages a 
possibility —the establishment of a non-hierarchized state of affairs or even 
the return to a supposed previous state like this— but actually ends up achiev-
ing exclusively for himself, in a somehow self-centered awkward way, this 
very same state. Cleisthenes, taking a step forward, extends political partici-
pation to the fellows who fought beside him against Isagoras and the Spar-
tans. Otanes was not able to attract the Persian people to his own cause be-
cause he addressed to his six comrades only, not to the people directly, as 
Peisistratus and Cleisthenes did. Moreover, Otanes did not propose a struc-
tural change of Persian society as Cleisthenes did in Athens, limiting his 
action to the suggestion of a non-government. And once again we can add 
another element of similarity to the cognitive metaphors that differentiates 
isonomia from demokratia: the former is the byproduct of attitudes like the 
dissolution of autocracies, and from that moment on it simply remains a 
fundamental basis for whatever else political state of affairs, among them 
even democracies. The latter presupposes active engagement in a collective 
construction. 
In a way quite similar to Darius’ and Peisistratus’, who initially sidelined 
the people to achieve their intents, Cleisthenes also sidelined his own oppo-
nents —the men around Isagoras. Strategic thinking obviously integrates also 
the cognitive and ethical metaphors associated with Athenian democracy and 
autocracy. Deceiving, cunning, and a conscious manipulation of truth and 
lies, though, are constituents exclusively associated with the latter —notice 
their absence along Cleisthenes’ digression—. But initiatives like these can 
be enforced only because rooted in a terrain with plenty of possibilities. A 
material element unite at least three of the four men so far focused —Otanes, 
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Darius, and Cleisthenes: they were wealthy, if not the wealthiest in their 
contexts—. Such economic dimension behind all the initiatives put into practice 
by these men forms the necessary background to government changes and the 
implementation of new political systems. Being rich, in other words, forms 
the non-sense, a non-mentioned or almost veiled dimension, the necessary 
condition for the production of sense, out of which initiatives like the ones 
examined can arise. Political activities like democracy and autocracy presup-
pose a background of social capabilities —isonomia and available material 
resources— to be performed. The difference, however, consists in that while 
the former concentrates these resources and means in one single individual, 
the latter is made by a continuous effort to make them collectively and equi-
tatively available. Two of these resources, economic and communication 
power, form the object of the next section.
4. Democracy, economy, and communication
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to detail how a democracy functions, so 
we will focus on two aspects just signaled by Herodotus, but which are key to 
contemporary democracies too: economics and communication. The second 
cluster of metaphors —pragmatic— comprehends the means and possibilities 
each character (Otanes and Cleisthenes) had to enforce their original prop-
osition. Both came from wealthy families and were able to constitute vast 
networks of influence. Herodotus plainly qualifies Otanes at his entrance in 
the main narrative: «[o]ne of the noblest and wealthiest Persians was a man 
called Otanes, whose father was Pharnaspes» (III 68.1). Cleisthenes was an 
offspring of the prestigious Alcmaeonids (VI 126-131) and grandson of the 
homonymous tyrant of Sicyon (V 66-67)10. Both men had at their disposition 
plenty of material resources to help them getting closer to the people through 
persuasion, as Cleisthenes did, but not Otanes. Consequently, the results of 
their respective political strifes become almost predictable: by relying on his 
six comrades only, without directly addressing the Persian people, Otanes is 
defeated. By taking a different path, Cleisthenes succeeded. Democracy thus 
turned out to be a project built up together with the demos who would directly 
10 A supplementary information about Cleisthenes’ economic power is provided by 
Isocrates (Antid., 232).
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benefit from it. Isonomia, on the other hand, despite eventually genuinely 
conceived by Otanes as collective construction, leaves the impression of 
being just a means to preserve and augment his own original power through 
levelling down that of his rivals. In a certain sense both succeeded, Otanes 
remaining untouchable together with his family, Cleisthenes paving the road 
for a century of democracy in Athens amid strong Alcmaeonid influence. 
Most important, in Cleisthenes’ case there is no say about a democracy hi-
jacked by economic power; on the contrary, this is the predictable outcome 
of a democracy enacted together with their direct beneficiaries. Even isono-
mia brings within itself the possibility of being collectively discussed and/
or implemented, as shows the expression ἐς μέσον, also key to democracy.
Herodotus’ very words vouchsafe that perception. Ὀτάνης μὲν ἐκέλευε ἐς 
μέσον Πέρσῃσι καταθεῖναι τὰ πρήγματα (III 80.2). In Cleisthenes’ case, the 
collective enactment of democracy becomes patent: ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον 
προσεταιρίζεται (V 66.2), πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ μοῖραν προσεθήκατο [scil. δῆμον] 
(V 69.2), ἦν τε τὸν δῆμον προσθέμενος πολλῷ κατύπερθε τῶν ἀντιστασιωτέων 
(V 69.2) —notice Herodotus’ fifth-century vocabulary alluding to a he-
taireia11, used as explanation of Cleisthenes’ triumphing over his opponents 
(πολλῷ κατύπερθε τῶν ἀντιστασιωτέων).
Those distinct stances can be subsumed in two practical issues implied by 
both isonomia and demokratia. Otanes’ proposition, if implemented, would have 
to extend through the vastness of the Persian empire. Besides, in his speech he 
does not mention how to do it, or by means of which institutions isonomia could 
be effectively put into practice. His proposal has a strong utopian flavour not 
because it contradicts what Darius called patrioi nomoi, but because in the end 
it looks unfeasible to the other six Persians, who therefore refused it. Cleis-
thenes, on the other hand, orchestrated a new regime within very narrow geo-
graphic limits through an immediate reorganization of Athenian society12. Be-
11 On the meaning and role of hetaireia in Athenian fifth-century democracy see Mitchell 
& Rhodes 1996, p. 12, and Bearzot 2013, pp. 136-137. On the leading role by the wealthiest 
in the Athenian democracy see Gray 2004, p. 158, Petrucciani 2014, p. 30, and Sebastiani 
2018b. On the specificity of the word for mid-fifth-century Athenian politics and the risks 
of extending its use —as did Herodotus and the author of the Athenaion politeia— see Ober 
1996, pp. 37-38.
12 On Cleisthenes’ reforms as a radical rationalization of the public space see Petrucciani 
2014, p. 14.
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sides, his act just put into practice something that was already implied in 
Athenian political traditions since Solon and Peisistratus but in a broader way: 
the gradual sharing of power with an ever larger number of citizens. Moreover, 
Cleisthenes’ solution helped Athenians ward off a concrete and tangible threat, 
the possibility of Isagoras recovering tyranny with the help of a foreign power, 
Sparta, while Otanes’ seemed dangerous —risk of mob rule, tyranny of the 
majority, or alleged excesses— at least to Darius and Megabyzus.
The decisive roles played by economic power in both ancient and contem-
porary democracies present deep analogies, notwithstanding the structural 
differences between direct and representative systems. In theory at least, 
relative economic equality at Athens was a precondition to democracy (Patri-
quin 2015). Mounk’s meditation, however upon the same issue but in con-
temporary democracies, would perfectly fit a discussion about its semantic 
equivalent in ancient democracies with but minor changes:
As long as money can easily buy power, many citizens understandably feel 
that political equality remains an empty promise. And as long as economic 
necessity radically constrains the kinds of choices they can make, many citi-
zens understandably feel that the freedom they were promised has not mate-
rialized. To live up to the most exalted claims of its adherents, liberal democ-
racy needs to be embedded in a broader context of social and economic justice 
—and make citizens feel that they actually hold power (2018, p. 157).
Ancient democracies would not be possible without the perspective of an 
eventual economic democracy. It was precisely why Otanes’ isonomia re-
mained just an utopia, never becoming a real polity unless to the only man 
able to pragmatically enforce it —Otanes himself. Such aspiration to eco-
nomic equality, as well as economic power, functions as a background of 
non-sense13 in Herodotus’ narrative, however not directly linked to the de-
mocracy issue so far discussed. Economic power is precisely what allows 
each character to enact or not their original intentions, while aspirations to 
equality are the main driver of people’s choices. Neither Otanes’ intentions 
nor his eventual aspirations were enough to counter the combined power of 
his other six companions, yet they perfectly suit his final choice. Cleisthenes, 
13 Understood as a lack of identifiable sense, not an absolute lack of sense, as in Di Paolo 
2014. See also Cuffari 2014, Di Paolo & Thompson 2014, and Popova & Cuffari 2018.
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on the other hand, could implement democracy only because he was able to 
associate his own personal wealth and skills with Athenian people’s aspira-
tions against tyranny.
In such context, communicating and persuading are direct consequences 
of economic power. The ability to catch attention and gain momentum —or 
not to, as in Otanes’ case— is intrinsically linked to the strategies both Otanes 
and Cleisthenes were able to develop. As stated before, Otanes spoke exclu-
sively to his six Persian comrades, what significantly narrowed possibilities 
and scope of isonomia to be converted into a plausible polity. Without the 
people who would directly benefit from it —a people difficult to reach out 
because of the extension of Persia—, isonomia remained just a quasi-utopia. 
Cleisthenes, on the other hand, is shown actively getting closer to the Athe-
nian people and seemingly persuading it to join efforts against a common 
enemy. 
The main trait that intertwines both Otanes’ and Cleisthenes’ initiatives 
and contemporary democracies is the promptness and effectiveness with 
which communication is established between proposers and receivers. Otanes, 
of course, addresses a very restrict circle of noblemen and has an immediate 
response. But also Cleisthenes seems to have done something quite similar. 
He also addressed a close circle of Athenians with a common enemy —τὸν 
Ἀθηναίων δῆμον— and in about four years his reforms were totally enacted 
(Ober 1996, p. 37).
The hallmark that seemingly contributed a lot to the effectiveness of 
Cleisthenes’ activity in comparison to Otanes’ failure can be summarized, 
from a communication standpoint, as a strategy remarkably similar to three 
of the «communication networks» described by O’Connor & Weatherall 
(2019): wheel, complete, and star14:
In a network with uniform beliefs, if a central individual changes belief, that 
person exerts strong conformist influence on peripheral individuals, who will 
14 Images available at O’Connor & Weatherall 2019, pp. 56-57. In the first network 
(wheel), nodes are interconnected to each other as in a circle having also a central one, the 
only one connected to all of them at the same time. In the second (complete), all nodes are 
interconnected to each other at the same time, thus dispensing with the central node. In the 
third, the central node is connected to all others, but there are no other connexions between 
them besides the central one.
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likely also change their beliefs. Targeting influential people to spread a new 
practice or belief is just one way propagandists take advantage of our con-
formist tendencies (p. 143).
To persuade a group to change beliefs, you need to find someone who shares 
their other core beliefs and values, and get that person to advocate your view 
(p. 178).
These models were conceived to discuss interactions between policy mak-
ers, scientists, and propagandists, interactions through which beliefs are pro-
duced, shared, and modified. These models not only illustrate how commu-
nication comes about in contemporary democracies especially when per-
formed through social media15. Rather, they are also particularly apt to de-
scribe how Cleisthenes quite probably availed himself of to get closer to the 
Athenian demos —his immediate receivers— and enact together with them 
the innovations they were eager for. Cleisthenes can thus be described as the 
«central individual», the «influential person», or the one «who shares their 
other core beliefs and values», the chief of which might likewise be the as-
piration to economic equality16. As economic factors, the effectiveness of his 
communication with the Athenian people was also a decisive factor respon-
sible for his fate opposite to Otanes’. And such effectiveness precisely points 
out to the element that makes demokratia share with isonomia the same core 
cognitive metaphor, truth-seeking: had Cleisthenes not been truthful to his 
Athenian countrymen, his reforms would not have been enacted nor endured 
for so long. As in a circle, cognition impacts ethics according to economic 
backgrounds which in turn promotes communication, the basis of which are 
either truths or lies.
5. Concluding remarks
One general takeaway from this exam is that resorting to metaphors as cat-
egorical classification allows us differentiate isonomia from demokratia in 
15 On contemporary democracies getting more direct every day due to internet interac-
tions, their potentialities and threats, and the constraints these phenomena impose, see Romano 
2013, pp. 65-73, Johnson & Gluck 2016, Cassese 2017, pp. 135-145, Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018, 
Mounk 2018, pp. 198-217, and Hendricks & Vestergaards 2019.
16 See Cartledge 1996, Raaflaub 1996.
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seeing them as target entities constituted by a wide network of sense-making 
processes. Truth-seeking, renunciation to the public space and adaptability to 
the outcome, amplitude of application, a certain utopic feature, difficulties 
in being communicated, and some anxiety to simplify reality complexities 
are the key metaphors with which Herodotus enacts his isonomia. And he 
makes in turn demokratia share with it the same truth-seeking core, but now 
implying occupation of the public space, limitation of its applicability, swift 
communication, and courageous collective engagement to complex public 
affairs sometimes in a Darius-like way —a fundamental flaw that can turn 
any democracy susceptible to give rise to forms of tyranny, either individual 
or collective.
Fundamental compliance with truth, on the one hand, as well as manip-
ulation of both truth and lies, on the other, have consequential behaviors 
which imply —or not— a centrifugal use of economic and communica-
tional resources, then respectively collective sharing of power or its con-
centration (in case of success). Noticing how these networks of sense-mak-
ing go along each other is key to understand how Herodotus narrativity 
can still help us bridge gaps between antiquity and contemporaneity, as 
well as improve our own democratic deliberation. Truth-issues are force-
fully democracy-issues, words are not simply words, but means to power 
with profound implications in anyone else’s lives. At the center of the 
cognitive metaphors so far evinced, and consequently fundamental also to 
the pragmatic stances that stem from them, are beliefs whose forge and 
transmission form our very living in the world. The ways we deal with 
beliefs show whether we recognize their sometimes paradoxical complex-
ities or use them as tools to quickly simplify and reduce the world to our 
own private horizons, thus evading hard decisions (O’Connor & Weather-
all 2019, p. 168).
Beliefs are at stake in the Persian debate, both concerning its historicity 
and the truthfulness of each speakers’ proposition. They are also key to 
understand the tricky behaviour the historian attributes to Darius through-
out book III, the contradictions implied in Otanes’ attitude at the end of the 
scene, and the steps taken by Cleisthenes in V 69. For contemporary recei-
vers to improve democracies, a fairly likely suggestion would be to try to 
permanently behave as an ancient ἵστωρ, hardly searching for factual truth 
and then forming beliefs out of its intricacies instead of the other way 
round, especially in an age of attention markets and the consequent wide-
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spread misinformation derived from them17. Gut feeling and wishful think-
ing, on the contrary, lead to the opposite direction, blatant populism or to-
talitarianism.
Second, the exam shows that the enactive approach is a promising tool for 
studying historiographic texts as Herodotus’ Histories, and not only fictional 
ones. Popova postulates that 
[i]n natural narratives or nonfictional discourse, the author of the discourse 
speaks in his or her own voice, while in fictional narratives, what is said is 
attributed to the speaking «voice» of the text itself and originates with the 
narrator, an entity that is separate from the actual author in most instances 
(2015, p. 63).
In Herodotus’ case, though, where characters have autonomous voices, 
being at the same time historical but embedded with fictional speeches and 
features, such a neat distinction is easily misleading. For our present purpose, 
most promising are her conclusions about how one is supposed to deal with 
metaphorical meaning: «[m]etaphorical meaning, on this view, would be 
understood as mutual co-achievement as a result of interacting in a particular 
context» (2015, p. 110). With no responsive receivers there is no co-achieve-
ments like narratives or democracies. 
This analysis was intended to add arguments to a perception that other 
fields had already stated long ago, but that seems each day more important 
for any citizen conscious of their roles as agents responsible for their own 
acts. Another contemporary truism detects the immense power that materi-
al and communicational resources have behind and upon the constitution of 
democracies, to the point of impacting their foundations and management. 
But the fundamental question to be answered is what each of us can do to 
at least get a better trade-off from these overwhelming pressures. If we 
cannot postulate miraculous solutions to save our every day more threat-
ened democracies, we can at least stay alert to the best metaphors we can 
make circulate so as to help improve them. For this, the selective combina-
tion of attributes from both isonomia and demokratia promoted by Herodo-
tus, as well as a permanent interplay between ancient democracies and their 
17 Further discussion on the issues with references in Bergmann 2018, Hendricks & 
Vestergaard 2019.
 I S O N O M I A ,  D E M O K R A T I A ,  A N D  E N A C T I O N  I N  H E R O D O T U S  53
Emerita LXXXVIII 1, 2020, pp. 33-57 ISSN 0013-6662 https://doi.org/10.3989/emerita.2020.03.1943
contemporary analogous systems18, still seem a promising spring. This 
past-oriented exam can constitute a safe fact-checking tool, via analogies 
with past contexts, to validate contemporary information with the benefit 
of extended hindsight and far less interference from cognitive bubbles and 
biases. Far from being a naive re-enaction of the aged historia magistra 
uitae, we merely suggest the metaphors so far discussed as bridges between 
Herodotus’ narrativity and democratic deliberations to come. Questions 
about justice or checks-and-balances, for example, even if absent from the 
texts so far examined, are also perfectly traceable in the main narrative as 
sources of metaphors.
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